The multisensory basis of the self:From body to identity to others

By grounding the self in the body, experimental psychology has taken the body as the starting point for a science of the self. One fundamental dimension of the bodily self is the sense of body ownership that refers to the special perceptual status of one’s own body, the feeling that “my body” belongs to me. The primary aim of this review article is to highlight recent advances in the study of body ownership and our understanding of the underlying neurocognitive processes in three ways. I first consider how the sense of body ownership has been investigated and elucidated in the context of multisensory integration. Beyond exteroception, recent studies have considered how this exteroceptively driven sense of body ownership can be linked to the other side of embodiment, that of the unobservable, yet felt, interoceptive body, suggesting that these two sides of embodiment interact to provide a unifying bodily self. Lastly, the multisensorial understanding of the self has been shown to have implications for our understanding of social relationships, especially in the context of self–other boundaries. Taken together, these three research strands motivate a unified model of the self inspired by current predictive coding models

The limits of process: On (re)reading Henri Bergson

This article offers a reading of the work of Henri Bergson as it pertains to organizations through the lens of ideas drawn from critical realism. It suggests an alternative to interpretations based on a stark division between process and realist perspectives. Much of the existing literature presents a rather partial view of Bergson’s work. A review suggests some interesting parallels with themes in critical realism, notably the emergence of mind. Critical realism has a focus on process at its heart, but is also concerned with how the products of such processes become stabilized and form the conditions for action. This suggests that attention might usefully be paid to the relationship between organizational action and the sedimented practices grouped under the heading of ‘routines’. More attention to Bergson’s account of the relationship between instinct, intuition and intelligence provides a link to the social character of thought, something which can be mapped on to Archer’s work on reflexivity and the ‘internal conversation’. This suggests that our analyses need to pay attention to both memory and history, to building and dwelling, rather than the one-sided focus found in some process theory accounts

Disgusting but harmless moral violations are perceived as harmful due to the negative emotions they elicit

Harmless but disgusting moral violations can be justified as harmful to others due to the negative emotions they elicit. The relationship between the emotions of anger and disgust and the harm associated to these emotions as a result of a moral violation was investigated. Results showed that a disgusting moral violation (taboo violation) described as harmless to others is more related to disgust than to anger. Such violation created a presumption of harm of three different types: to the community, nature, and the individual. Disgust was a mediator between the taboo violation and the presumption of harm to nature, whereas anger was a mediator between the taboo violation and the presumption of harm to the individual. In general, results also showed that in moral violations that are harmless to others, the emotions of anger and disgust allow people to presume harm to symbolic entities such as nature and the community as a result of such violations

A Robot Model of OC-Spectrum Disorders : Design Framework, Implementation and First Experiments

© 2019 Massachusetts Institute of TechnologyComputational psychiatry is increasingly establishing itself as valuable discipline for understanding human mental disorders. However, robot models and their potential for investigating embodied and contextual aspects of mental health have been, to date, largely unexplored. In this paper, we present an initial robot model of obsessive-compulsive (OC) spectrum disorders based on an embodied motivation-based control architecture for decision making in autonomous robots. The OC family of conditions is chiefly characterized by obsessions (recurrent, invasive thoughts) and/or compulsions (an urge to carry out certain repetitive or ritualized behaviors). The design of our robot model follows and illustrates a general design framework that we have proposed to ground research in robot models of mental disorders, and to link it with existing methodologies in psychiatry, and notably in the design of animal models. To test and validate our model, we present and discuss initial experiments, results and quantitative and qualitative analysis regarding the compulsive and obsessive elements of OC-spectrum disorders. While this initial stage of development only models basic elements of such disorders, our results already shed light on aspects of the underlying theoretical model that are not obvious simply from consideration of the model.Peer reviewe

Providing Self-Aware Systems with Reflexivity

We propose a new type of self-aware systems inspired by ideas from higher-order theories of consciousness. First, we discussed the crucial distinction between introspection and reflexion. Then, we focus on computational reflexion as a mechanism by which a computer program can inspect its own code at every stage of the computation. Finally, we provide a formal definition and a proof-of-concept implementation of computational reflexion, viewed as an enriched form of program interpretation and a way to dynamically "augment" a computational process.Comment: 12 pages plus bibliography, appendices with code description, code of the proof-of-concept implementation, and examples of executio

Not all features are created equal: Processing asymmetries between location and object features

Previous research has shown spontaneous location processing when location is not a task relevant feature and when a target is presented together with distractors. The present study investigates whether such processing can occur in the absence of distractor inhibition, and whether there is a processing asymmetry between location and an object feature. The results show that not all features are created equal. Whereas attending to an object’s color or texture led to the involuntary processing of that object’s location, attending to an object’s location did not necessarily result in the encoding of its color or texture when these nonspatial properties were not task relevant. These results add to the body of evidence demonstrating the special role of location in attentional selection. They also provide a clearer picture of the interactions among location, object features, and participants’ behavioral goals

A critique of Paulo Freire’s perspective on human nature to inform the construction of theoretical underpinnings for research

From Crossref via Jisc Publications RouterHistory: epub 2020-04-20, issued 2020-04-20Article version: VoRKate Sanders - ORCID 0000-0003-3516-7030 https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3516-7030This article presents a critique of Paulo Freire's philosophical perspective on human nature in the context of a doctoral research study to explore “muchness” or nurses’ subjective experience of well‐being; and demonstrates how this critique has informed the refinement of the theoretical principles used to inform research methodology and methods. Engaging in philosophical groundwork is essential for research coherence and integrity. Through this groundwork, largely informed by Freire's critical pedagogy and his ideas on humanization, I recognized the need to clarify my understanding of the concepts of persons and personhood and how this related to Freire's use of the term human beings. This clarification process is essential to ensure congruence between the theoretical principles that I draw from his work and my beliefs about persons, personhood and person‐centredness. The article begins with a brief introduction to the research, followed by an overview of Freire's philosophical perspectives, and subsequently, the critique process is presented and discussed. This process involved engaging with the vast literature and debates about what it means to be a person, to make sense of the often complex and contradictory arguments. Eventually, three headings emerged that helped me to frame my evolving understanding: Our species: human beings ; The kind that we are: human nature ; and This person that I am: personhood. Through this process of exploration, I recognized that Freire's perspective on human nature (a) foregrounded cognitive rationality, which presented itself as a limitation when considering my ontological beliefs and the focus of my research, leading me to draw on the work of Mark Johnson and his ideas about embodiment to help me to further develop my theoretical principles; (b) focused on the “collective” rather than individuals, which is a shortcoming in relation to person‐centred research that acknowledges the uniqueness of participants.21pubpub

Affective interoceptive inference: Evidence from heart-beat evoked brain potentials.

The perception of internal bodily signals (interoception) is central to many theories of emotion and embodied cognition. According to recent theoretical views, the sensory processing of visceral signals such as one's own heartbeat is determined by top-down predictions about the expected interoceptive state of the body (interoceptive inference). In this EEG study we examined neural responses to heartbeats following expected and unexpected emotional stimuli. We used a modified stimulus repetition task in which pairs of facial expressions were presented with repeating or alternating emotional content, and we manipulated the emotional valence and the likelihood of stimulus repetition. We found that affective predictions of external socially relevant information modulated the heartbeat-evoked potential, a marker of cardiac interoception. Crucially, the HEP changes highly relied on the expected emotional content of the facial expression. Thus, expected negative faces led to a decreased HEP amplitude, whereas such an effect was not observed after an expected neutral face. These results suggest that valence-specific affective predictions, and their uniquely associated predicted bodily sensory state, can reduce or amplify cardiac interoceptive responses. In addition, the affective repetition effects were dependent on repetition probability, highlighting the influence of top-down exteroceptive predictions on interoception. Our results are in line with recent models of interoception supporting the idea that predicted bodily states influence sensory processing of salient external information